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ABSTRACT: This paper investigates two questions regarding closely held corporations. First, possible 
differences between closely and widely held corporations are explored. Second, a model is developed to 
investigate what factors and to what extent these factors influence a person to become an active owner 
of a closely held corporation. A background to the first question is that profits in closely held corporations 
in Sweden may be taxed as labour income, with a progressive marginal tax, while profits in corporations 
with broad ownership are taxed as capital income, at a flat rate. If the expected return after tax is lower 
in closely held corporations compared to corporations with a broad ownership, entrepreneurs and 
investors will demand a higher pre-tax risk-adjusted return. Evidence from Swedish data, covering all 
Swedish corporations, does not seem to reject these hypotheses. The model developed to address the 
second question utilizes extensive individual panel data. Some simple simulations are carried out, 
indicating that changes in taxation have important impact on the propensity to become a closely held 
corporation owner. A conclusion is that the tax-system restrains entrepreneurship and potentially 
employment and growth. Some suggestions to improve and expand the model are issued. Remaining key 
questions are e.g. how do changes in the tax rules for closely held corporations affect efficiency aspects 





1.  INTRODUCTION 
Employment, growth and prosperity in the 
economy depend on a sufficient number of firms 
and employers providing places for people to 
work. According to recent research, 
entrepreneurship and small firms have a key role 
in the analysis of mechanisms driving the 
dynamics of structural changes, e.g. in the 
business sector. 
1 As a result SME-policy has 
become a key element in the Lisbon Partnership 
for Growth and Jobs that was re-launched in 
2005. The current financial and economic crisis 
makes it even more important to investigate ways 
and means to improve opportunities for new jobs. 
Structural conditions for entrepreneurship, smaller 
and new firms may have a key role to play. 
 
This paper will look into the Swedish tax system 
and its possible impact on entrepreneurs and 
small firms. It is primarily interested in effects 
from tax schemes and tax structures on incentives 
to start up and become an active owner of a CHC. 
The tax system is particularly relevant study 
object, since it is at the finger tips of policy 
makers and it may serve as a powerful tool in the 
economic policy toolbox. 
 
Sweden essentially has only one kind of limited 
companies. However, to prevent incorporation 
motivated by tax evasion the limited companies 
are from a tax perspective classified into two 
groups - closely held corporations (CHC) and 
widely held corporations (WHC). The focus of this 
paper is on CHC´s, because they are generally 
small and governed by their owner(s), and may be 
                                                
1   Background and surveys can be found in e.g. 
de Mooij and Nicodème (2007), Gordon and 
Cullen (2002), Hansson (2008) and Lundström 
(2009). 
of key importance to growth and job creation in 
the economy. To better understand how risk, 
capital structure and ownership are related, part 
of this paper investigates the differences between 
CHC´s and WHC´s. 
 
The setup of this paper is as follows. It starts with 
a review of relevant literature. Next, it explores 
whether recently-available micro-data, covering 
all Swedish enterprises between 2000 and 2007, 
supports theoretically justified hypotheses about 
differences between CHC’s and WHC’s. An 
extensive data set is used, covering all 
corporations in Sweden during the period 2000-
2007. Moreover, extensive information about the 
owners is available from organisation forms where 
individual income statements refer to a specific 
corporation. Specifically, this concerns businesses 
organised as sole proprietorships, partnerships 
and closely held corporations.  
 
Finally, a model is developed to investigate what 
factors and to what extent these factors influence 
a person to become an active owner of a CHC. The 
model is implemented in an existing dynamic 
micro-simulation model, SWEtaxben, which up to 
now lacks a treatment of self-employment and 
entrepreneurship.  SWEtaxben gives us the 
opportunity to explore how the decision to become 
a CHC owner interact with other choices, and to 
retrieve measurements of budget effects, income 
distribution, labour supply, and so on. The model 
applies data covering register data on about eight 
percent of the Swedish population.  
2.  TAXATION OF SMALL FIRMS 
Crawford and Freedman (2008) claim that taxes 
matter when individuals make decisions upon 
becoming self-employed or realize business ERICSON - FALL    Taxation of closely held corporations – efficiency aspects 28 
concepts. In Europe most countries offer the 
entrepreneurs the incentive to run a business as a 
sole proprietorship, in a partnership or in a 
corporation. The main differences between the 
legal forms concern the owners’ liabilities, number 
of owners and taxation. Recent trends towards 
dual income taxation, in opposite to a 
comprehensive income tax, in Europe have 
highlighted the dilemma of promoting 
entrepreneurship and at the same time prevent a 
conversion of labour income to lower taxed 
income from capital. 
2 Different kinds of provisions 
are often implemented to prevent this conversion, 
and one example is the so called 3:12 legislation 
in Sweden. This section discusses how taxes may 
affect economic growth, the number of 
entrepreneurs, and financing issues pertaining to 
investment projects. 
2.1. Taxation and growth 
The classification of corporations into CHC´s and 
WHC´s should be seen against the background of 
the government’s ambition to confine the tax 
advantages of converting labour income into 
income from capital. From an international 
perspective this type of legislation is common in 
countries with a dual tax system and is 
characterized to be complicated and endlessly 
debated. Crawford and Freedman (2008) discuss 
the challenge to develop a sound tax system 
focusing on the boundaries of taxation between 
income from employment, self-employment and 
incorporated business owners. The authors argue 
that there is lack of evidence that tax provisions 
promoting incorporation 
3 support growth and 
employment. Instead any tax incentives cause a 
need of provisions that prevent a transfer of 
i n c o m e  f r o m  l a b o u r  t o  i n c o m e  f r o m  c a p i t a l  o r  
capital gains – provisions that by nature become 
complex and subjective, and also create 
administrative costs for both entrepreneurs and 
revenue authorities. Analyzing data from 1996 
and 2006, which encloses a reform period with 
reduced taxation on small corporations, they find 
a strong increase in number of businesses, but 
only in the group of businesses with no 
employees. 
 
Henrekson and Johansson (2008) present another 
view on the importance of small and young firms 
in a meta-analysis of 20 published studies. Their 
main conclusion is that fast growing firms, so-
called ‘Gazelles’ are on average smaller and 
younger than other firms, and stand for the larger 
portion of net employment growth. The authors 
conclude “that employment in new firms is crucial 
for total employment growth and seems to be at 
least of equal importance as the net job 
contribution of continuing (Gazelle) firms.” (op. 
cit., p.18) An argument to promote 
entrepreneurship is then to increase the likelihood 
of future Gazelles. 
 
Asoni and Sanandaji (2009) discuss how 
                                                
2   For a discussion of dual income taxation in 
Europe see Genser and Reutter (2007). 
3   The forming of a new corporation. 
progressive taxes affect both the number of 
entries into self-employment and the quality of 
the innovation or business idea, where “Quality 
can be thought of as representing the social 
welfare created by the firm”. 
4 T h e y  s h o w  t h a t  
progressive taxes decrease the average quality of 
the idea. The intuition is that progressive taxes 
make it less profitable to continue to develop 
ideas until a better one might come up. Assuming 
that Gazelles and high-quality firms probably have 
much in common, the above studies lead to 
conclude that low marginal taxes, increase the 
quality of firms, while also increase the probability 
of Gazelles emerging. Taxing in this line of 
reasoning hence is of major importance for 
growth. 
2.2. Taxation and number of firms 
There is a vast literature trying to explain the 
emergence of self-employment, or entrepreneurial 
activity, theoretically and empirically. This paper is 
primarily interested in effects from tax schemes 
and tax structures on incentives to start up and 
become an active owner of a CHC. Research on 
this topic must be interpreted carefully, since 
differences in tax structures between countries 
prevents conclusions drawn for one country to be 
applied to other countries. For example, empirical 
results regarding the effects of income taxes on 
self-employment in Sweden often contradict in 
studies on US-Canada data compared. This is 
because income from small businesses to a large 
extent has been taxed as labour income in 
Sweden. On the other hand, the structure in the 
US is much more generous to profit making firms, 
and an income transfer from employment to self-
employment is much more profitable in the US 
than in Sweden 
5.  
 
Fölster (2002) and Hansson (2008b) explore the 
relation between income taxes and self-
employment in Sweden. Fölster explores variation 
of tax-rates between countries as well as over 
time and confirmes an expected negative relation 
between taxes and self-employment. Hansson 
uses Swedish LINDA data (briefly described 
section 3) to estimate the impact from taxes on 
the probability to become self-employed. The 
results show that high levels of income taxes 
reduce the probability to become self-employed. 
 
The size of the tax wedge 
6 from different taxation 
schemes on incomes earned as employed vs. self-
employed does have a direct effect on the 
required risk premium and therefore on the 
probability to become self-employed. All taxes, 
                                                
4   Asoni and Sanandaji (2009) p. 6. 
5   One of the reasons for this is that, contrary to 
Sweden, the US corporate tax system is 
‘symmetric’; it allows to deduct losses from 
previous profits. 
6   The common definition of the tax wedge is the 
sum of all taxes divided by the tax base. For 
example, if the wage is 100, the marginal 
income tax is 57 per cent and the social 
security contribution fee is 32 per cent, then 
the tax wedge is 67 per cent (=(57+32)/132). ERICSON - FALL    Taxation of closely held corporations – efficiency aspects 29 
e.g. pay roll taxes, taxes on capital gains and 
corporate taxes have impact on the tax wedge. 
However, not only the tax wedge, but also the 
general tax level has an impact on the level of 
self-employment. Probably the most important 
reason for this is that many studies find a lack of 
capital to be the main obstacle for potential 
entrepreneurs. High taxes make it more difficult to 
gather the necessary capital from savings and 
thus prevent a potential entrepreneur to start up 
an enterprise. De Mooij and Nicodème (2007) use 
data from 17 European countries between 1997 
and 2003 to find large and significant effects from 
the size of the tax wedge between income from 
employment and incorporated self-employed. 
Gordon & Cullen (2002) conclude that “tax policy 
and macroeconomic policies seem to be key 
factors generating entrepreneurial activity.” 
Gordon (2006) compares the tax systems in USA 
and Sweden and concludes that the regulations in 
Sweden punish business failures much harder 
than in the USA. This enhanced risk is not 
counteracted by any promotion, as lower taxes of 
businesses that survive and prosper. A simulation 
shows that the self-employment rate would fall by 
66 percent in the US if Swedish income and 
corporate taxes were implemented in the US. 
 
An overall conclusion is that taxes matter when it 
comes to the decision of becoming self-employed. 
However, when comparing results from different 
countries, the effect of income taxes on self-
employment is ambiguous. One explanation is 
disparity in tax structures. Any regulations 
determining whether incomes are taxed as labour 
income, capital income and/or corporate income 
are of importance, and the same goes for the 
framework of rules determining deductibility of 
losses. Another important factor is the possibilities 
of smoothing incomes over time. We have not 
found any literature highlighting this aspect. In 
Sweden, for example, a corporation can allocate 
up to 25 percent of net profits to a tax allocation 
reserve that must be liquidated after six years. 
Additionally, in businesses organised as sole 
proprietors and partnerships, profits can be taxed 
as a corporate profit and funded into the 
corporation for infinite time. This fund can be used 
as a carry back instrument to smooth profits over 
time, a mechanism not available in limited 
corporations.
7  
2.3. Taxation and financing 
The previous section discussed research showing 
and explaining how taxes can reduce the number 
of firms. But taxes can also affect the existing 
firms’ investment behaviour (and hence 
employment) through the taxation of capital 
income. More traditional theories state that 
taxation at the ownership level is irrelevant to the 
supply of capital for investments, since a firm will 
find sufficient capital in an open economy as soon 
                                                
7    As a temporary measure, the Norwegian 
parliament has decided that losses in 2008-
2009 could be carried back to 2006-2007. An 
upper limit of 20 MNOK per corporation and 
year applies. 
as risk-adjusted rate of return of the investment 
meets the equilibrium rate of return established in 
the international financial market. Thus, domestic 
taxation affecting the owner level would (only) 
affect the level of private savings, but taxation 
enforced at the company level would affect 
investments as well.  
 
However, in practice, smaller firms and 
entrepreneurs have restricted access to 
international financial markets. One explanation 
for this is that information is costly and complex 
to produce, provide and verify. There is always a 
case of asymmetric information, since a large or 
foreign investor has few possibilities to access and 
verify relevant information on investment 
opportunities in small, or perhaps not even yet 
started, companies. Secondly, there is a liquidity 
problem associated to small firm assets and a 
third possible reason is that these assets seldom 
are divisible. An investor will be stuck with the 
i n v e s t m e n t  f o r  a  p e r i o d  o f  t i m e  a s  t h e r e  i s  n o  
regular market to trade the asset in. For these 
reasons, the only available investors for small 
business usually are the three “F:s”: family, 
friends and (perhaps) fools. Bearing this in mind, 
it seems fair to assume that, as a result of this 
restricted access to capital markets, domestic 
taxation at the owner level may in fact influence 
investments. But taxing business incomes may 
also impact investment decisions. If business 
income is taxed heavily, only business ideas with 
sufficiently high pre-tax high profitability or pre-
tax rates of return will be undertaken. Assuming 
that a high rate of return comes with high risk, 
investment projects may shift towards higher-risk 
projects. 
 
This risk aspect of investment decisions is 
particularly important when studying the situation 
for small and owner managed firms. Relevant 
factors are e.g. sources of finance – including the 
lack of substitutability between investment in a 
closely held corporation and investment in the 
stock market and the risk exposure for an 
entrepreneur, often suffering from lower social 
security benefit (as compared to regular 
employment) and lack of exit options (as 
compared to investment in the stock market). But 
higher risk levels should result in increasing 
resistance from banks providing loans. So more 
than other firms, taxation of business incomes 
may induce small firms to take more risk, and 
therefore to decrease their opportunities to 
receive funds from the capital market, which 
means that they will have to use private savings, 
venture capital or similar private equity 
structures. 
 
Third and finally, the capital structure in small 
companies may also be distorted by the lock-up 
effect. A relative high taxation of income from 
capital in small firms makes it less attractive for 
the owner to pay dividends resulting in an 
inefficiently high rate of shareholders’ equity. ERICSON - FALL    Taxation of closely held corporations – efficiency aspects 30 
3.  TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS IN 
SWEDEN AND PROBABLE EFFECTS 
Corporate income in all limited Swedish companies 
is taxed at a flat rate of 26.3 per cent since 
January 1 2009; the previous rate was 28 per 
cent. Individual income is taxed under a dual 
system. Labour and business incomes are taxed 
under progressive rates, ranging from slightly 
above 30 per cent up to 57 per cent, while the 
ordinary tax rate for capital income is proportional 
at the rate of 30 per cent. This rate applies to e.g. 
interest, dividends, capital gains etc. from WHC’s, 
listed on a stock exchange. For capital income 
from non listed (private) corporations the 
corresponding tax rate is 25 per cent, although a 
special framework of rules (3:12 rules) applies to 
CHC’s.  
 
In this paper, the definition of a CHC is made from 
a taxation perspective. Depending on i.e. the CHC 
stock owner’s share in the company and an 
advanced assessment of the owner’s importance 
for the corporation’s earnings ability, the owner’s 
stocks may be considered to be qualified and a 
limited amount of capital income is taxed at 20 
per cent. If this criterion is met, the corporation is 
defined as a CHC. However, any capital income 
exceeding certain limits – so called limitation 
amount (gränsbelopp) – are reclassified as labour 
income and taxed under the progressive rates. If 
the stock owner in a CHC has an ordinary labour 
income leaving him or her at the top marginal tax 
rate, any income from the qualified stocks 
therefore may be taxed at a rate of 57 per cent. 
The frame work of rules determining the limitation 
amount is complex and based on the company’s 




Considering regular economic double taxation, the 
full tax wedge on capital income is 48.41
9 per cent 
for income from listed WHC’s. For non listed 
companies (excl. CHC) the tax wedge is 44.725
10 
per cent. Finally, for CHC’s the tax wedge ranges 
from 41.04
11 to 68.309
12 per cent.  
 
The CHC framework of rules was substantially 
reformed in 2006. Previously, the rules were 
considered to be quite harsh for the tax payers, 
often forcing them to pay the full marginal tax 
rate of 57 per cent on income emanating from 
their business. Through the 2006 reform the 
situation is changed to some extent. From the tax 
payers’ point of view, the two major advantages 
of the reform are the introduction of a lower tax 
rate for capital income (20 or 25 per cent as 
opposed to the regular rate of 30 per cent 
previous to the reform) and a more generous 
calibration of the rules determining the limitation 
                                                
8 More information on the framework of rules is 
available from the National Tax Agency and in 
Sørensen (2008).  
9   48.41  =26.3+(100-26.3)*30. 
10  44.725=26.3+(100-26.3)*25. 
11  41.04  =26.3+(100-26.3)*20. 
12  68.309=26.3+(100-26.3)*57. 
amount. In particular, owners to companies with a 
large wage sum benefit from the favourable rules, 
allowing them large dividends or capital gains, 
without risk to have these income reclassified and 
taxed under the full marginal tax regime up to 57 
per cent. On the other hand some advantages of 
the previous system were changed, most 
importantly was the abolishment of the partial 
single taxation up to a certain (low) rate of return. 
Due to the fact that the reform had a rather large 
number of components, some with positive impact 
and some with negative impact, it is hard to make 
comparisons. Moreover, the impact of the reform 
is dependent on quite a few circumstances within 
the company; for example, the impact will be very 
different depending on the company’s capital 
structure and its number of employees. Dividend 
and financial policy prior to the reform will also be 
of importance when comparisons are made 
between CHC’s and WHC’s before and after the 
2006 reform. 
 
When looking at CHC’s and possible effects from 
the tax system, it appears that before the reform 
of 2006 there was a quite clear progressive 
structure, especially for highly profitable 
investments. A simple comparison to investments 
in the regular stock market would suggest that 
closely held corporations were treated favourably 
by the tax system when they yielded a low rate of 
return but less favourable when they yielded a 
normal, or above normal rate of return. This 
suggests that for most levels, small company 
investments required a higher rate of return, and 
therefore higher risk, in order to yield the same 
net of tax rate of return as a stock market 
investment. Following this line of reasoning, one 
would expect that in equilibrium there would be an 
average of higher rates of return for small 
companies than for stock market investments. 
One would therefore anticipate a higher risk level 
in smaller companies. This would then have 
implications on the structure of financing in 
smaller companies, compared to other companies. 
Up to a certain point, the possibility to finance in 
the banking sector may be equivalent for smaller 
and for larger companies. But higher risk levels 
should result in increasing resistance from banks 
providing loans. To put it simple, banks avoid high 
risk. Higher risk business ideas may not gain 
financing through bank loans. Typically, higher 
risk financing may instead come from different 
forms of equity, such as domestic informal 
investments, business angels, venture capital or 
similar private equity structures. 
 
Previous empirical results from Swedish data 
indicated differences between CHC’s and WHC’s. 
In particular, the CHC’s had higher rates of return 
and higher solvency margins, indicating a higher 
risk profile, which in turn corresponded to a high 
corporate profitability before tax. There seemed to 
be an equilibrium where the relatively few 
businesses able to acquire the high levels of 
profitability have responded to the high risk by ERICSON - FALL    Taxation of closely held corporations – efficiency aspects 31 
having a high solvency margin.
13 
 
The tax reforms from 2006 may have altered the 
situation. Direct comparisons between the 
systems are difficult to make, due to different 
methods to define the tax base etc. One simplified 
description would be that the marginal tax rate at 
the lower end of the rate of return scale has risen 
at the same time as the income level above which 
the tax rate is higher has been moved up. 
Figure 1  Schematic illustration of old and new 




















On behalf of the Swedish Ministry of Finance, 
Sørensen (2008) has presented how the taxation 
differs between alternative forms of business 
organisation in Sweden. When it comes to start-up 
firms Sørensen conclude: 
“In the case of new start-up firms where the 
reward to entrepreneurship often takes the 
form of a capital gain when the initial owner 
sells the business, proprietorships generally 
face a much higher tax burden than 
corporations regardless of whether the 
burden is measured in unadjusted or in risk-
adjusted terms. The main reason is that 
proprietors are liable to social security tax as 
well as progressive personal labour income 
tax on capital gains in excess of the imputed 
return to equity, unless the gain stems from 
the sale of real estate. A start-up firm 
subject to the tax rules for widely held 
corporations faces the lowest tax burden. The 
unadjusted and risk-adjusted tax burdens on 
a start-up firm organized as a closely held 
corporation are somewhat higher, but still far 
below those on proprietorships. Thus the 
different treatment of capital gains appears 
to be an important source of tax 
discrimination across organizational forms.”
14 
 
Table 1 presents the average effective wage rates 
(AETR), the risk-adjusted average effective wage 
rates (RAETR) and some basic statistics on 
different forms of organisations.  
                                                
13  Andersson et al (2004) provide some analysis 
of the tax system previous to 2006. 
14  Sørensen (2008) p. 18. ERICSON - FALL    Taxation of closely held corporations – efficiency aspects 32 
 












AETR (%) 55.4 31.8 24.3 27.3 27.6 32
RAETR (%) 60.1 34.5 26.3 29.6 30 34.7
Turnover (MSEK) 181,602 1,143,356
Wage bill (MSEK) 8,381 180,418












A striking fact is that taxes levied on CHC´s are 
higher compared to taxes on WHC´s, although 
these small firms are alleged to be the abode for 
entrepreneurial activity and an important piece in 
a society striving for growth and employment. 
Note that the WHC´s often belong to a group and 
a large share of these companies is owned by the 
public sector. Sørensen concludes: “Among firms 
with individual personal owners, the closely held 
corporation is therefore the most important 
organizational form in terms of turnover, wage bill 
and number of employees.”
15 
4.  DATA 
Statistics Sweden provides data for all Swedish 
companies within the data base FRIDA, which 
contains approximately 1  000 variables for each 
company. The primary source is withdrawals from 
standardised accounts (SRU) provided by the 
National Tax Agency. FRIDA includes several 
organisational forms for companies, e.g. limited 
corporations (aktiebolag), partnerships 
(handelsbolag) and sole proprietorships (enskilda 
näringsidkare).  
 
The data base LINDA, studying individual persons, 
is also available from Statistics Sweden. It 
contains slightly more than 1  000 variables for 
some 300  000 sample individual persons (3% of 
the total population). Supplementary information 
regarding members of households is also 
available. Several sources are used e.g. National 
Tax Agency, National Social Insurance Board and 
the Swedish Public Employment Service. 
 
This paper uses consistent data from 2000-2007. 
All data is anonymized. It is possible to track a 
company or an individual person over time within 
each one of the data bases. However, there is no 
available information on any connections between 
individual persons in LINDA and companies in 
FRIDA. Neither is there full information regarding 
creation or termination for companies. Only 
companies that deliver an income statement to 
the Swedish Companies Registration Office are 
included in FRIDA. A consequence is that we do 
not know for what reason a company disappears 
from the database. It could be bankruptcy, fusion, 
                                                
15  Sørensen (2008) p. 30. 
liquidation or any another circumstance that would 




The main interest is on limited corporations. 
WHC´s can be quoted on a stock exchange, while 
CHC´s are always non-quoted and also meet 
some additional criteria regarding ownership 
concentration. Since we are only interested in 
active comparable private corporations the 
following criteria are applied when selecting our 
population. 
 
1.  The corporation is a limited company 
2.  The corporation is not registered as a 
financial institute 
3.  The major part of the corporation is 
privately owned 
4.  The revenue is positive 
 
Table 2 presents the number of CHC´s and 
WHC´s that fulfil the criteria each year.
17 Most 
private limited corporations are classified as a CHC 
and thereby affected by the 3:12 legislation, 
aiming to prevent income shifting from labour into 
capital income. As several studies report that 
taxes matter on self-employment rates, business 
activity, and so on, we expect to find differences 
when comparing aggregate statistics on CHC´s 
and WHC´s.  
                                                
16    More information on FRIDA and LINDA is 
available from Statistics Sweden. 
17  A corporation is defined to be a CHC if at least 
one owner files a particular form – the K10 
form. This form is not mandatory if the owner 
has not received any capital gain or dividend 
from the corporation. To adjust for this 
dropping off we define a corporation to be a 
CHC during the whole period as soon as any 
owner has delivered a K10 form in any year. 
This definition explains probably the differences 
in Table 1 and 2. ERICSON - FALL    Taxation of closely held corporations – efficiency aspects 33 









The database FRIDA is used to describe and 
analyse the structure of the CHC’s companies, a 
task carried out in section 5. The database LINDA 
is applied in section 6, as data source for 
estimation and development of simulation models. 
5.  CHARACTERISTICS OF CHC’S AND WHC’S 
This section gives a brief overview of some 
descriptive data originating from FRIDA. The main 
interest is on limited corporations. WHC’s are 
often listed on a stock exchange, while CHC’s are 
non-listed and meet some additional criteria 
regarding ownership concentration.  
5.1. Capital structure 
A brief picture of the capital structure can be 
obtained by a look at the solvency margin, defined 
as equity + untaxed reserves, divided by balance 
sheet total. The solvency margin may vary 
between companies e.g. according to line of 
industry, but as a general rule of thumb a 
company’s will improve its chances to find 
investors and to get favourable conditions 
regarding required rate of return etc. if it has a 
high solvency margin. There is a difference 
between CHC’s and WHC’s solvency margin of 
around 10 percentage points. During the period of 
time studied, the difference is quite stable. This 
observation seems to support the hypothesis that 
CHC’s have to compensate a higher average risk 
through a larger portion of equity capital.  
 
A look at the liquidity situation in the different 
types of corporations points in the same direction. 
For CHC’s the curve has a kink at the end of the 
studied period. Interpretations must of course be 
done with precaution, but an explanation for this 
may be that the change of rules has triggered 
higher dividends, and thereby affected liquidity. 
Some further evidence is presented below.
























In line with our reasoning above, there may be 
a v e r a g e  h i g h e r  r i s k  i n  C H C ’ s .  F r o m  t h i s  i t  m a y  
follow that profitability also would be higher 
among the CHC’s. As shown in the figures below, 
there are some empirical observations supporting 
this. In fact, the difference in profitability between 
CHC’s and WHC’s rises in the end of the period. 
This would be a bit of a surprise, since tax rules 
have been relaxed since 2006. To some extent, 
time lag could explain this, as profitability in a 
certain year may originate from investment 
decisions made some years earlier, under a 
different tax regime.
 




















5.3. Interest on debts 
Following the reasoning outline above regarding 
the higher solvency margin among CHC’s, a 
consequence would be that the CHC’s have less 
favourable opportunities to borrow from banks 
and that their loans will be more expensive. The 
figure below shows some evidence supporting 
this. Average interest on debt is higher for CHC’s 
and this has been the case during the whole ERICSON - FALL    Taxation of closely held corporations – efficiency aspects 34 
studied period. Since the tax reform in 2006, the 
difference has been slightly reduced, which might 
have to do with diminishing differences between 
the risk levels of new projects.  










5.4. Establishments and disappearances 
Unfortunately, the data does not provide a perfect 
variable to study the survival rate of the different 
types of corporations. A possible approximation 
may be to investigate new establishments and 
disappearances for each year studied. We find 
that there are small differences for new 
establishments, at least until the two latest years. 
There are a strong increase for WHC’s in 2006 and 
an even stronger increase for CHC’s in 2007. To 
some extent, this may be explained by a 
favourable business cycle. 
 
When it comes to disappearances, there seems to 
be a difference stable over time. An explanation 
for the lower rate among CHC’s may be the higher 
level of personal relation from the owners. The 
previously discussed higher solvency margin may 
also contribute to a higher endurance, which in 
turn could result in relatively fewer 
disappearances. 
 



















The important role for employment from CHC’s is 
described in the figure below. The total number of 
employees within all CHC’s is plotted on the left 
hand axis. On the right hand axis the average 
number of employees in each CHC is found. Close 
to one million people find their jobs through these 
companies. The development has been quite 
strong during the period, and a slight increase in 
growth rate may be discerned. Favourable impact 
from the business cycle probably explains at least 
part of this. There is probably a time lag from any 
employment effects emanating from the 2006 
change of tax rules. However, the slight down turn 
in average number of employees has probably to 
do with the sharp increase in new establishments, 
often with the owner as sole employee. 
 














5.6. Owners background 
To find out more regarding owners background, it 
is possible to study available information on the 
previous status of recently established owners. 
The strongest increase in new establishments is 
among people previously involved in other CHC’s. 
These are probably people with high initial 
knowledge of the frame work of rules and high 
adaptability to changes. Furthermore this is in line 
with theory on serial entrepreneurs etc. The 
probability of managing a small firm may be 
higher among people with previous experience. 
 











5.7. Dividends and capital gains 
As previously described, CHC’s have showed 
increased profitability since the new taxation rules ERICSON - FALL    Taxation of closely held corporations – efficiency aspects 35 
that came into effect in 2006. Another quite 
strong indication for this is that dividends have 
risen sharply, reaching for 30 Bn SEK, compared 
to a previous average level of some 10 Bn. To 
some extent, the dividends may emanate from 
previous years’ retained earnings. The previously 
reported decrease in liquidity is in line with such 
an interpretation.  
 
Capital gains are highly volatile and must be 
interpreted with high precaution. In the transition 
from 2005 to 2006 the frame work rules were 
subject to excessive uncertainty, triggering many 
owners to bring forward transactions. A threat of 
sharp increase in taxation of capital gains were 
projected. This has had impact on the statistics in 
the figure below. However, the rules were 
changed retroactively and in 2007 the level seems 
to be re-established on a historical average level. 
 
















5.8. Summary of characteristics 
Among the characteristics that may be of 
particular interest is probably first of all the fact 
that dividends have soared so remarkable. 
Dividends doubled the first year after the reform 
and have risen even higher the following year. If 
the new level will persist, the reform will prove to 
be profitable for government finances. Other 
characteristics that may be worth highlighting are 
the higher average rate of return and net margin 
among CHC’s, possibly reflecting higher average 
risk in these companies. Such an interpretation 
would also be in line with the characteristics 
stating that solvency margin and liquidity are 
higher among CHC’s. 
6.  TAXES AND INCENTIVES TO BECOME A 
BUSINESS OWNER 
The decision to become self-employed involves a 
choice between different forms of business 
organisation. Most Swedish entrepreneurs, more 
than two out of three, choose to start up their 
business as a sole proprietorship or partnership, 
both with unlimited liabilities. A smaller portion of 
new entrepreneurs chooses to directly establish a 
limited closely held corporation (CHC).
18 The latter 
business organisation form is familiar to transform 
prospering sole proprietorships or partnerships 
                                                
18    The standard minimum share capital in a 




The model described below is restricted to analyse 
CHC ownerships. Any owner experience from sole 
proprietorships and partnerships are taken into 
account. CHC’s are considered to be the most 
interesting organisational form to analyse in 
detail. Prospering businesses and investment 
projects often prefer this kind of organisation, as 
the limited company provides a limited risk. The 
different taxation of CHC’s, described in section 2, 
makes this organisation form especially interesting 
for business contracting (more) employees. 
Finally, an advantage of the CHC form (compared 
to sole proprietorship or partnership) is that it 
may signal a higher level of stability and 
seriousness, as current regulations require CHC’s 
to produce a yearly public annual report that is 
examined by an auditor. 
 
How is the choice of business organisation form 
affected by different factors, e.g. the taxation? In 
this section we present a model aiming to explain 
and simulate to what extent individuals choose to 
become self-employed as an active owner of a 
CHC. In the first subsection we approach the issue 
simply by analysing a broad number of variables 
and to what extent they contribute to explain the 
probability of becoming a CHC owner. In the 
following sections we develop a simple model to 
carry out some simulations, in which the 
importance of some policy variables is analysed 
more in detail. 
6.1. A model for CHC ownership 
Information about the individuals and the 
corresponding households is used to explain the 
probability of becoming self-employed, i.e. taking 
the step to be an owner in a CHC. Thus, the model 
is only applicable to individuals with labour income 
and it excludes current CHC owners. The model 
aims to pay regard to two explanations of 
importance to individual´s choices whether to 
become self-employed: heterogeneity in 
preferences and the expected return. 
 
To represent gains or losses from becoming self-
employed or not we estimate the change in 
disposable income when the individuals’ labour 
income instead are taxed as corporate income and 
dividends. These calculations are performed for 
each individual (and household) in the static micro 
simulation model SWEtaxben, which represents a 
detailed depiction of the regulations for tax and 
benefits in Sweden.
19 To calculate this difference 
the tax/benefit model SWEtaxben, is used twice. 
First, all individuals are assumed to keep their 
observed status and yearly salary. Second, they 
are all assumed to start-up a CHC corporation that 
reports an income equivalent to the observed 
salary plus pay roll tax. Each owner is assumed to 
optimise the mix of salary and dividend to 
maximise after tax income. By analysing 
“difference in disposable income”, it may be 
possible to explore the impact of the tax and 
                                                
19  See Ericson et al. (2009) for a documentation 
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transfer systems on the return of an individual’s 
fixed labour cost. Thereby, the return from either 
becoming self-employed or remaining an 
employee will depend on an estimate of individual 
productivity and production, measured as the 
current labour cost. In addition to the difference in 
disposable income, the choice of becoming self-
employed is assumed to depend on whether the 
individual has a previous experience from 
entrepreneurship in a partnership or sole 
proprietorship, along with personal information 
about gender, age, marital status, birthplace, 
settlement and education. 
As the simulation model SWEtaxben is applicable 
to the legalisation in 2006 only, the data used in 
this analysis is restricted to this year along with 
information about the individuals´ status (self-
employed or not) in 2005. The number of 
observations extracted from the database LINDA 
is 284  368 and statistics on the explanatory 
variables and the dependent variable are 
presented in Table 3. On average the disposable 
income would increase by 5 000 SEK a year when 
the individuals´ labour income is taxed as 
corporate income and dividends, instead of as 
labour income.










University degree 19.8%  
The probability for an individual to become a CHC 
owner is modelled as an ordinary Probit model and 
estimates of the unknown parameters are 
presented in Table 4.
20  
 
According to the estimated parameters the return 
of shifting to self-employment as a CHC owner has 
a significant effect on the probability to become 
self-employed in a CHC. The parameters of the 
other variables are all significant and have 
expected signs. In opposition to studies using US 
data, high education does not increase the 
propensity to become self-employed. As 
mentioned in section 2.1, a common explanation 
has to do with the taxation of high income, and 
how this taxation differs whether a person is an 
employee or self-employed. This difference is 
much smaller in Sweden than in the US. In 
Sweden only a limited part of the earnings in a 
CHC can be taxed at a lower rate, i.e. as income 
from capital. That is, the high marginal tax on 
labour income remains even though the income 
stems from a CHC. 
 
The elasticity of becoming a CHC owner with 
respect to the difference in disposable income 
variable is on average 0.07. That is, if the 
difference in disposable income between being an 
employee vs. self-employed as a CHC owner 
increases by 10 percent, we expect the probability 
to become a CHC owner to increase by 0.7 
percent. However, the elasticity varies between 
individuals. An example of this is shown in  
Table 5, where the average elasticity by the 
hourly wage deciles is presented. The elasticity 
increases by the wage rate, which could be 
explained by the non-linear tax- and benefit 
                                                
20 For more details on the model and the 
underlying method, see Ericson et al (2009). 
system, and the non-linear Probit model. In the 
next section the model is used to evaluate a tax 
reform aiming to increase entrepreneurship by 
increasing the return after tax.ERICSON - FALL    Taxation of closely held corporations – efficiency aspects 37 
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All    156  0.07 
1    95  0.01 
2    111  0.01 
3    120  0.01 







6.2. SWEtaxben and CHC owners 
SWEtaxben
21 is a Swedish tax/benefit micro 
simulation model. It is an extended version of the 
static micro simulation model FASIT
22 governed by 
Statistics Sweden and used by the government, 
researchers and associations to evaluate how 
different reforms’ affect e.g. government budget, 
income distribution and marginal taxes.  
 
Relating to the microsimulation literature
23 this 
model can be labelled a static microsimulation 
model with behavioural changes. This behavioural 
change takes two different forms and is simulated 
through two different types of models; first binary 
models that describe mobility in/out from non-
work states such as old age pension, disability, 
unemployment, long term sickness and second 
models that describe change in working hours and 
welfare participation. Thus, apart from the choice 
to work or not to work, working hours conditional 
on working as well as welfare participation are 
treated as endogenous variables. Some of the 
                                                
21    See Ericson and Flood (2009) for a 
documentation of SWEtaxben. 
22  Statistics Sweden provides a documentation of 
FASIT 
23    See e.g. Aaberge and Colombino. (2008), 
Mofitt (1983) and Van Soest (1995). 
SWEtaxben’s features: 
 
-  Labour supply is modelled as a household 
decision where both observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity are considered 
along with a complete description of the 
budget set. 
-  All individuals are categorized a priori to a 
certain status (child, old age pensioner, 
disability pensioner, student, unemployed, 
other, long term sick or working). Given a set 
of binary dynamic logit models, each 
individual are set at risk to change status 
when the environment changes, e.g. taxes or 
income from other members in the 
household. 
-  Welfare is measured by a social welfare 
function (SWF) with the opportunity to reflect 
different levels of inequality aversion. 
 
This paper aims to extend SWEtaxben with a 
status representing self-employment. Information 
on individual’s income-tax statement determines 
whether he or she is an active owner and receives 
income from a CHC. This information is combined 
with a prediction from the model presented above. 
Thereby, an optimal status is determined, where 
the after tax income is maximised. In the next 
section a couple of reforms affecting the taxes of ERICSON - FALL    Taxation of closely held corporations – efficiency aspects 38 
CHC owners and the CHC itself, is explored. 
6.3. Simulated tax reforms 
The expected number of CHC owners may change 
when changes are made to the tax system. Below, 
a sample of such changes of taxes and regulations 
are simulated. All employed (and non CHC owner) 
individuals with a positive labour income are 
studied. For each such individual, the outcome of 
becoming a new CHC owner is calculated under 
the simulated change of tax rules. If the outcome 
is favourable, the simulation will show to what 
extent the number of CHC owners will increase. 
6.3.1.  A simplifying standard rule for the 
limitation amount 
In 2006 a simplification in the income-tax 
statement was introduced for CHC owners. An 
option of applying a standard rule was made 
available. This made it possible to refrain from 
tedious calculations, based on historical equity 
contribution and salaries, aiming to decide the 
threshold – so called limitation amount (see 
section 3) – that limits the amount of dividends 
that could be taxed under the capital income 
regime. The new standard rule states a standard 
amount (schablonbelopp), working as a minimum 
level for the limitation amount. In 2006 the 
standard amount was set to 64 950 SEK. The 
amount increased to 91 800 SEK in 2007, and in 
the forthcoming assessment year (2010) the 
amount is further increased to about 120 000 
SEK. 
 
The introduction of the standard amount for CHC 
owners did not only simplify the income-tax 
statement, it also reduced taxation for owners 
whose dividends exceeded the limitation amount 
according to the traditional rules. As mentioned in 
section 2, the reform in 2006 included a tax-cut 
from 30 percent to 20 percent on capital income 
from a CHC. 
 
To evaluate the effects of a reform where the 
standard amount is increased, the probability of 
becoming self-employed is estimated in the 
model. This is carried out in a simulation covering 
all employed individuals earning more than 300 
000 SEK (equal to around 1 million individuals). 
The standard amount is allowed to vary between 0 
– 325 000 SEK. Some 7 000 new CHC owners is 















Figure 9 Increasing standard amount and number 



























6.3.2.  Capital tax 
Since 2006, the capital income tax rate has been 
lowered from 30 percent to 20 percent on 
dividends below the limitation amount. Figure 10 
shows how the expected number of new CHC 
owners is affected by changes in the capital tax 
rate. In this simulation, covering all employed 
individuals earning more than 300 000 SEK (equal 
to around 1 million individuals), the standard 
amount is fixed according to present rules, at 
120 000 SEK. 
Figure 10  Decreasing capital tax and number of 

























6.3.3.  Payroll tax  
From January 1, 2009, the payroll tax was 
lowered from 32.42 percent to 31.42 percent. For 
employees younger than 26 years of age the rate 
was cut by about 50 percent. Currently, there is a 
public debate on how to increase employment in 
small and medium sized corporations. Among 
different issues, pros and cons of a targeted 
decrease of the pay-roll tax is being discussed. 
Figure 11 shows a simulation, covering all 
employed individuals with no substantial transfer 
or similar income (equal to around 2.5 million 
individuals), where the number of CHC owners is 
expected to rise when a general cut in the pay roll 











Figure 11  Reduction of pay roll tax and number 



























6.4. The CHC’s and their owners over time 
– dynamics 
The model predicts whether an individual will 
become self-employed as an active owner of a 
CHC. However, it does not say anything about the 
corporation itself. All start-ups in the model 
developed in this paper are hitherto only supposed 
to consist of the owner and his own efforts. This 
assumption may be considered unrealistic for both 
start-ups and mature firms. The dynamics over 
time, where firms are prospering, voluntarily 
liquidated, or defaulted, are ignored. Therefore, it 
would be interesting to develop a corporate model 
that could simulate how corporations evolve over 
time. Given the individual start-up decision, such 
a corporate model also could simulate how 
decisions affect the firm’s destiny, and the yield to 
the owner(s). 
 
Another, much simpler approach might be to 
replicate the existing firms. In such an approach, 
individual decisions to become self-employed 
would be implemented through existing firms, 
with all its characteristics. These existing firms 
would be replicated up to an estimated number 
and put in the new owner’s hand. Thus, a steady 
state would be simulated, rather than the time at 
start-up. 
7.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Empirical data seem to confirm the hypothesis 
that differences exist between CHC’s and WHC’s. 
The observed differences suggest that the 
Swedish tax system discriminates CHC’s. 
Moreover, the differences indicate that the tax 
system forces the CHC’s to undertake more risky 
investments in order to counteract the higher tax 
rate. Higher risk decreases supply and increases 
cost of foreign capital, distorting the capital 
structure. Excessive solidity along with a personal 
relation to the corporation may be explaining 
factors to the higher survival rate among CHC’s. 
Since the recent tax reforms, aiming to reduce the 
tax burden on owners of CHC’s, the number of 
CHC’s, as well as the number of employees in 
CHC-firms, have increased. It may still be too 
early to draw any stronger conclusions, but these 
increases may be seen as further indications 
confirming our hypothesis. 
 
In modelling CHC ownership, there are some 
interesting conclusions worth mentioning. Data 
seem to confirm expected outcomes of the duality 
in the tax-system that causes pre-tax profitability 
t o  b e  h i g h e r  i n  C H C ’ s  c o m p a r e d  t o  W H C ’ s .  A  
conclusion is that the tax-system restrains 
entrepreneurship and potentially employment and 
growth. Moreover, the choice to become self-
employed is affected by the expected yield. 
 
A model explaining how firms evolve over time 
has to be developed to answer the key questions: 
how do changes in the tax rules for closely held 
corporations affect efficiency aspects with 
significance for e.g. employment, government tax 
revenue and income distribution. To enable this, 
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